Syria had everybody's attention when UK parliament decided that Britain
would not take part in any action following the chemical weapons
attacks on the outskirts of Damascus and the US also backed away from
carrying out air strikes (1). Since
then, Syria has not exactly been forgotten - how could it
be forgotten when atrocities of an almost unimaginable type are
brought to light - but there has not been the sustained focus to
discuss what can be, or has to be, done. The slaughter continues,
obviously, but much of public opinion seems to think that we "avoided
war" (2).
Objectively, the non-intervention has been disastrous. The
opposition Coalition (3)
has lost almost all credibility and influence with those fighting the
Assad regime on the ground. In turn, the fighting forces are becoming
increasingly dominated by jihadists (Salafis) and some elements are
showing a brutality that approaches that of the regime (4). Any
opposition body that said it was prepared to enter negotiations, without the precondition of Assad stepping down, would lose even more credibility and influence on the ground (5). So, it is hard to see any such
negotiations getting started in any meaningful way.
In the light of this, it is difficult to see a way forward.
One
action should be taken unilaterally, by those who support the Syrian
opposition. More pressure should be put on Gulf states, such as Kuwait,
to cut off funding to the more extreme groups. Also, Turkey should
attempt to prevent fighters and supplies for these groups passing into
Syria (6). If support continued, through Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, to the more "moderate" groups and was channelled more
effectively through the
Coalition and the SMC/FSA control structure, this could help reconstitute an opposition body that was seen as representative and able to control groups on the ground (7), and thus able to take part in
negotiations without the precondition.
The (relatively) moderate elements of the opposition
would retain an
ambivalent attitude towards al-Nusra, but at least ISIS might be isolated (8).
That
Iran should be involved in the
negotiations seems to me self-evident (9). The primary concern for the US and its
allies (especially Israel) would be the nuclear issue, so this is
likely to be a prerequisite, but if, if, a deal can be reached on
Iran's
nuclear programme, it could open the way for progress on talks over
Syria. The Assad regime could hardly survive without the support of
Russia, Iran and Hezbollah (which would not continue to support it
against the wishes of Tehran), just as the opposition could not
continue the fight without support from Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, with the tacit approval of the US and other Western
powers (10). This is not to discuss the details of any possible
agreement or to minimise the difficulty of reaching one, but it is
clear that all actors with the real capacity to influence events on the
ground need to be involved if a way out of this conflict is to be
found (11).
Otherwise, “A
fourth option – in which allies give both sides enough to survive but
not prevail – would perpetuate a proxy war with Syrians as primary
victims. It is the present stage and the likeliest forecast for the
foreseeable future.” (IGC, June 2013, Page i )
Notes:
(1)
This continued a pattern whereby the regime is able to bank "on the
international community’s divisions and dithering" (IGC report,
27 June 2013,
Syria’s Metastasising Conflicts,
p1). As an example of this: 'After weeks of British and French pressure
forced the end of an EU embargo on arms supplies to the opposition, UK
Foreign Secretary William Hague suggested that material support was
necessary because “we’re only going to get a political solution to this
crisis if the opposition – the moderate, sensible parts of the
opposition – can’t be destroyed”. But less than a month later, UK media
reported Prime Minister David Cameron had abandoned plans to provide
weapons, partly out of concern some would end up with jihadis. SMC head
Salim Idris was incensed, arguing that without Western support “soon
there will be no Free Syrian Army to arm. The Islamic groups will take
control of everything, and this is not in the interests of Britain”.'
(IGC, 17 Oct 2013,
Anything But Politics: The State of Syria’s Political Opposition, p17, fn71)
(2) See comments here (11/10)
Syria chemical weapons monitors win Nobel Peace Prize.
(3) the
Coalition or National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which includes the SNC (Syrian National Council).
(4)
The Latakia massacres;
Assad’s snipers target women and their unborn babies.
(5)
"all governments, companies, and individuals should immediately stop
selling or supplying weapons, ammunition, materiel, and funds to these
groups, given compelling evidence that they have committed crimes
against humanity, until they stop committing these crimes ... Turkey
should increase border patrols, restrict entry of fighters and arm
flows to groups credibly found to be implicated in systematic human
rights violations." (HRW,
“You
Can Still See Their Blood”, p7)
"there
should be real commitment by all donor states [..] to adopt a shared framework for militant funding and
supplies that bans Gulf-based private fundraising, reaches agreement on
authorised recipients and imposes strict rules of behaviour. ... Turkey
should disrupt the flow of jihadi fighters and fundraisers transiting
the country into northern Syria." (IGC, 17 Oct 2013,
Anything But Politics: The State of Syria’s Political Opposition,
p29) "Though Saudi Arabia claims to have reined in its clerics’
independent fundraising efforts, such campaigns openly persist in
Kuwait and, to a lesser extent, Qatar, attracting contributions from
private donors throughout the region." (IGC, Oct 2013, p18, fn76)
(6)
This would, in the words of the IGC “make more likely the emergence of
a more coherent, structured, representative and thus effective
interlocutor”.
(7) See
Syria: to negotiate or not?; also
Inside Syria, 19 Oct 2013 (Geneva II: The last exit for peace?
youtube)
, discussion with George Sabra, president of the SNC and Farah al-Attasi, member
of the Coalition.
(8)
Put bluntly, given the current imbalance of military resources, they
need Nusra's suicide bombers, to make an initial breach of defences
when attacking military installations. As for ISIS (the Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham or ash-Sham), while they too undoubtedly take part
in military operations against the regime, they also concentrate much
of their effort on establishing their strict islamic rule
in "liberated" areas, thus alienating the population and creating what
many see as an "alternative dictatorship". One example is of
activists forced to flee from Raqqa (
Al Jazeera, 18 Aug).
(9) "The West’s
apparent determination to exclude Iran from a peace conference (perhaps
under review in the wake of that country’s presidential elections) is
short-sighted: keeping Tehran from Geneva will not lessen its role in
Damascus." (IGC, June 2013, Page iii )
(10)
Israel's government has reacted with scepticism to the possibility of a deal with
Iran. But the alternative
- not resolving the issue peacefully - is difficult to contemplate. If
the US was not willing to carry out even limited strikes against Syria,
how would it find the political will for an attack on Iran, of
potentially even greater significance than Iraq or Syria,
especially when a relatively moderate president has come into office?
And could Israel carry out action on its own?
Saudi
Arabia is said to have "been angered by the increasing rapport between
Washington and Iran", this being one of the possible factors in it
saying it would not take up its UNSC seat (
Al Jazeera, 19 Oct), but is Saudi
Arabia prepared to fight Iran to the death (literally in the case of
even larger numbers of Syrians), when there is a possible alternative,
through
détente with Iran.
France
and the UK, as well as being UNSC P5 members, have taken the lead
within the EU in providing direct assistance to the opposition, such as
it has been - see note (1).
Iraq's
government may also have a
role to play. Since recovering to a state of relative peace, after the
disastrous period of late 2006 / early 2007, it has slipped back into a
state of daily terrorist attacks. This follows a period in early 2013
of peaceful protests, largely unreported (except by Al Jazeera), by the
Arab Sunni minority against exclusion by the Shi'a-led Maliki
government. Officially, the government says it does not support either
side in the Syrian conflict, but Iraqi Shi'a are reported to have taken
part in the fighting on behalf of the regime and of course there are
linkages between largely rebel-held eastern Syria and Sunni-dominated
western Iraq, with probably a two-way flow of fighters / terrorists and
weapons.
(11)
"When, in January 2013, Assad presented his vision of reconciliation,
power sharing and reform, he avoided any discussion of possible
negotiations over the regime’s core (the ruling family, praetorian
guards and security elite). Instead, he spoke of potential changes in
the fictional realm of the state – via a national unity government,
revised constitution and democratic elections, all of which essentially
will remain irrelevant for as long as real power is vested elsewhere."
(IGC, June 2013, p21)
We
knew this already of course, but it is useful to be reminded so
graphically as Figure 3: while al-Qa'ida eventually want the
entire Earth under their banner, first they aim to establish the more
immediate "State of the Caliphate" : this includes, of course, the
Iberian Peninsula (Andalusia), north and west Africa, as far as,
the map is a bit "broad-brush", but as far as a line between Libreville
and Zanzibar, southeastern Europe as far as Vienna, etc.
